2026년 현재 SOA Security Lab은 IT 인증 가운데서도 높은 관심을 받는 시험입니다. KoreaDumps의 S90.20 연습문제로 이 인기 자격에 도전해 보시기 바랍니다.

SOA S90.20 시험 개요:

SOA S90.20 시험 요강 주제:

SOA S90.20 시험 궁금증 해소 코너

최신 SOA Certification S90.20 무료샘플문제

문제 #1

Service Consumer A sends a request message with a Username token to Service A (1).
Service B authenticates the request by verifying the security credentials from the Username token with a shared identity store (2), To process Service Consumer A's request message. Service A must use Services B, C, and D.
Each of these three services also requires the Username token (3. 6, 9) in order to authenticate Service Consumer A by using the same shared identity store (4, 7, 10). Upon each successful authentication, each of the three services (B, C, and D) issues a response message back to Service A (5, 8, 11).
Upon receiving and processing the data in all three response messages, Service A sends its own response message to Service Consumer A (12).

There are plans implement a single sign-on security mechanism in this service composition architecture. The service contracts for Services A, C, and D can be modified with minimal impact in order to provide support for the additional messaging requirements of the single sign-on mechanism. However, Service B's service contract is tightly coupled to its implementation and, as a result, this type of change to its service contract is not possible as it would require too many modifications to the underlying service implementation.
Given the fact that Service B's service contract cannot be changed to support single sign- on, how can a single sign-on mechanism still be implemented across all services?

A. Apply the Brokered Authentication pattern to establish Service A as an authentication broker that issues a SAML token for Service Consumer A and forwards Service Consumer A's token to other services. Apply the Trusted Subsystem pattern to create a utility service that acts as a trusted subsystem for Service B.
This utility service is able to perform authentication using the SAML token from Service A and can then generate a Username token by embedding its own credentials when accessing Service B.
This way, Service B can perform authentication of request messages as it does now, but it can still participate in the single sign-on message exchanges without requiring changes to its service contract.
B. Replace the Username tokens with X.509 digital certificates. This allows for the single sign-on mechanism to be implemented without requiring changes to any of the service contracts.
C. Apply the Brokered Authentication pattern so that Service A acts as an authentication broker that issues a SAML token on behalf of Service Consumer A, and forwards this token to Services C and D.
Create a new utility service is positioned between Service A and Service B.
This utility service perform a conversion of the SAML token to a Username token, and then forwards the Username token to Service B so that Service B can still perform authentication of incoming requests using its own security mechanism.
D. Apply the Brokered Authentication pattern so that Service A acts as an authentication broker that issues a SAML token for Service Consumer A and forwards Service Consumer A's token to Services C and D.
Create a second service contract for Service B that supports single sign-on. This way, Service B can still perform authentication of incoming requests using the old service contract while allowing for the processing of SAML tokens using the new service contract.

문제 #2

Service A has two specific service consumers, Service Consumer A and Service Consumer B (1). Both service consumers are required to provide security credentials in order for Service A to perform authentication using an identity store (2). If a service consumer's request message is successfully authenticated, Service A processes the request by exchanging messages with Service B (3) and then Service C (4). With each of these message exchanges, Service A collects data necessary to perform a query against historical data stored in a proprietary legacy system. Service A's request to the legacy system must be authenticated (5). The legacy system only provides access control using a single account. If the request from Service A is permitted, it will be able to access all of the data stored in the legacy system. If the request is not permitted, none of the data stored in the legacy system can be accessed. Upon successfully retrieving the requested data (6), Service A generates a response message that is sent back to either Service Consumer A or B.
The legacy system is also used independently by Service D without requiring any authentication. Furthermore, the legacy system has no auditing feature and therefore cannot record when data access from Service A or Service D occurs. If the legacy system encounters an error when processing a request, it generates descriptive error codes.

This service composition architecture needs to be upgraded in order to fulfill the following new security requirements: 1. Service Consumers A and B have different access permissions and therefore, data received from the legacy system must be filtered prior to issuing a response message to one of these two service consumers. 2. Service Consumer A's request messages must be digitally signed, whereas request messages from Service Consumer B do not need to be digitally signed.
Which of the following statements describes a solution that fulfills these requirements?

A. The Trusted Subsystem pattern is applied by introducing a utility service that encapsulates the legacy system. After successful authentication, Service A creates a signed SAML assertion stating what access level the service consumer has. The utility service inspects the signed SAML assertion in order to authenticate Service A.
The utility service accesses the legacy system using the account information originally provided by Service Consumer A or B.
The utility service evaluates the level of authorization of the original service consumer and filters data received from the legacy system accordingly.
B. The Trusted Subsystem pattern is applied together with the Message Screening pattern by introducing a utility service that encapsulated the legacy system and contains message screening logic. First, the utility service evaluates the incoming request messages to ensure that it is digitally signed, when necessary. After successful verification the request message is authenticated, and Service A performs the necessary processing. The data returned from the legacy system is filtered by the utility service's message screening logic in order to ensure that only authorized data is returned to Service Consumers A and B.
C. The Trusted Subsystem pattern is applied by introducing a utility service that encapsulates the legacy system. Two different policies are created for Service A's service contract, only one requiring a digitally signed request message. The utility service accesses the legacy system using the single account. Service A authenticates the service consumer using the identity store and, if successfully authenticated, Service A send a message containing the service consumer's credentials to the utility service. The identity store is also used by the utility service to authenticate request messages received from Service A.
The utility service evaluates the level of authorization of the original service consumer and filters data received from the legacy system accordingly.
D. The Trusted Subsystem pattern is applied by introducing a utility service that encapsulates the legacy system. To support access by service consumers issuing request messages with and without digital signatures, policy alternatives are added to Service A's service contract. Service A authenticates the service consumer's request against the identity store and verifies compliance to the policy. Service A then creates a signed SAML assertion containing an authentication statement and the authorization decision. The utility service inspects the signed SAML assertions to authenticate the service consumer and then access the legacy system using a single account. The data returned by the legacy system is filtered by the utility service, according to the information in the SAML assertions.

문제 #3

Service Consumer A sends a request message to Service A (1), after which Service A sends a request message to Service B (2). Service B forwards the message to have its contents calculated by Service C (3). After receiving the results of the calculations via a response message from Service C (4), Service B then requests additional data by sending a request message to Service D (5). Service D retrieves the necessary data from Database A (6), formats it into an XML document, and sends the response message containing the XML-formatted data to Service B (7). Service B appends this XML document with the calculation results received from Service C, and then records the entire contents of the XML document into Database B (8). Finally, Service B sends a response message to Service A (9) and Service A sends a response message to Service Consumer A (10).
Services A, B and D are agnostic services that belong to Organization A and are also being reused in other service compositions. Service C is a publicly accessible calculation service that resides outside of the organizational boundary. Database A is a shared database used by other systems within Organization A and Database B is dedicated to exclusive access by Service B.

Recently, Service D received request messages containing improperly formatted database retrieval requests. All of these request messages contained data that originated from Service C.
There is a strong suspicion that an attacker from outside of the organization has been attempting to carry out SOL injection attacks. Furthermore, it has been decided that each service that writes data to a database must keep a separate log file that records a timestamp of each database record change. Because of a data privacy disclosure requirement used by Organization A, the service contracts of these services need to indicate that this logging activity may occur.
How can the service composition architecture be improved to avoid SQL injection attacks originating from Service C - and - how can the data privacy disclosure requirement be fulfilled?

A. Apply the Data Origin Authentication pattern to authenticate data received from Service C.
Service C digitally signs any data sent in response messages to Service B.
Service B can then verify that the data has not been modified during transit and that it originated from Service C.
Secondly, update the service contracts for Services B and D with an ignorable WS-Policy assertion that communicates the possibility of the logging activity. The service contracts for Services B and D are updated with an optional WS-Policy assertion that provides service consumers with the option of complying to the logging requirements.
B. Apply the Service Perimeter Guard pattern together with the Message Screening pattern in order to establish a perimeter service with message screening logic. Position the perimeter service between Service C and Service B.
The message screening logic rejects or filters out potentially harmful content in messages sent from Service C, prior to being forwarded to Service B.
Secondly, update the service contracts for Services B and D with an optional WS-Policy assertion that provides service consumers with the option of complying to the logging requirements.
C. Apply the Data Origin Authentication pattern to authenticate data received from Service C.
Service C digitally signs any data sent in response messages to Service B.
Service B can then verify that the data has not been modified during transit and that it originated from Service C.
Secondly, update the service contracts for Services B and D with an ignorable WS-Policy assertion that communicates the possibility of the logging activity.
D. Apply the Message Screening pattern in order to establish a service agent with message screening logic. Position the service agent between Service C and Service B.
The service agent's message screening logic can reject or filter out potentially harmful content in messages sent from Service C, before being processed by Service B.
Secondly, update the service contracts for Services B and D with an ignorable WS-Policy assertion that communicates the possibility of the logging activity.

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